Operations Research Management Science - The Netwar in Iraq

<BODY bgcolor="#ffffff" link="cc0000" vlink="cc0000" text="#000000"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br>   <table border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0 width=480><tr valign=top> <td width=10><img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 hspace=4 border=0></td> <td width=470> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B><I><A HREF="../../ORMS.shtml" TARGET="_top">OR/MS Today</A> - June 2003</I></B></font><BR> <hr size="1"> <img src="cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <font face="times new roman, times"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B>Military OR</B></FONT><br> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <FONT SIZE="+2"><B>The Netwar in Iraq</B></FONT><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <FONT SIZE="+1"><I>U.S.-led Coalition's swift victory demonstrates that "in an information-rich environment, networks tend to defeat hierarchies."</I></FONT><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><B>By Douglas A. Samuelson</B></FONT><br> <hr size="1"> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br>    The U.S.-led Coalition's swift victory in Iraq was more than a military campaign. It was also a test of a new way of fighting wars, and fuel for a lively debate about some fundamental principles of strategy. Operations research played an important role in this major transformation of tactics, strategy and doctrine.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Key elements of the new approach:<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Information supremacy.</I></B> The Coalition forces had accurate and precise information about the opposing forces within minutes, at all times, because of air and space surveillance and computer-based communications. The Coalition commanders also had continuously updated, accurate and precise knowledge of where their own forces and other resources were, generally available to them on computer screens in forward command positions. All U.S. units had global positioning system (GPS) devices to tell them where they were and help them find other locations of interest. The Iraqi commanders, in contrast, were kept guessing about where the Coalition forces were and what they might do next.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Air and space dominance.</I></B> The GPS systems rely on satellites for mapping and communications. Satellite surveillance was also critically valuable in maintaining the Coalition commanders' awareness of the terrain and the opposition. The Coalition forces could attack Iraqi forces from the air whenever and wherever they chose, even in bad weather, because of improved electronics and because there was no serious airborne opposition.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Maneuvering speed.</I></B> The Coalition forces had fast tanks and other vehicles and could therefore exploit opportunities and react to problems quickly. This reduced the need for massive air strikes before the ground operations, and the need for helicopters, which are much more vulnerable than armored vehicles, later in the action. In contrast, Iraqi forces were often forced to choose between staying in positions away from the line of advance or trying to move, under intense surveillance and aerial attack, to positions where they could have done more to slow the attack.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Close coordination of forces.</I></B> Marine units cooperated closely with Army units. Ground commanders could call in air strikes that were carried out within minutes. Aircraft carriers stationed nearby provided much additional air support. The improved communications meant that the carrier-based aircraft could be redirected in flight, as target information changed.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Precise weapons.</I></B> Enhancements in guidance technology meant that almost all air and artillery strikes hit their intended targets. This improved the coordination and speed the Coalition forces could achieve, lowered the risk of civilian casualties, and reduced the amount of ammunition they had to carry to remain effective.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Streamlined logistics.</I></B> The ability to fly missions from carriers reduced the need for forward air bases on land. The large numbers of fighting vehicles carrying their own fuel and ammunition and the ability to conduct precise, quick airlift of supplies reduced the need for trucks and other non-fighting components to keep combat forces resupplied. This, in turn, enabled Coalition forces to remain in combat and on the move almost continuously for many days at a time.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Flexibility.</I></B> The ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances also made it possible for Coalition forces to remain effective with less advance planning than has usually been needed.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Special Forces.</I></B> This campaign relied much more than past wars on Special Forces teams that carried out information-gathering, target spotting, damage assessment, disruption of enemy communications, and search and rescue missions.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> <LI> <B><I>Psychological advantage.</I></B> Coalition commanders were able to call opposing commanders' cellular phones and urge them to surrender their units. That the Coalition commanders knew these phone numbers, and other key information, appears to have helped significantly in producing some surrenders, desertions and other helpful effects.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Arthur Cebrowski, who recently retired as a vice admiral and director of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Force Transformation, told <I>Jane's Defence Weekly</I> that he expects analysis of operations in Iraq will reveal a "new air-land dynamic: the discovery of a new 'sweet spot' in the relationship between land and air warfare and a tighter integration of the two. The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very, very important factor."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> In an early but comprehensive analysis prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analyst Anthony Cordesman added, "Combined arms radically changed the timelines from the first Gulf War. The first war saw a 38-day air bombardment, much of which had to focus on suppressing the Iraqi Air Force and surface-level air defenses... [This time] ground and air operations began on Day One, and massive countrywide air and missile strikes against Iraqi leadership targets and ground forces began on Day Three versus Day Seven. In the first Gulf War, the ground advance forced Saddam to order the withdrawal of his forces from Kuwait on Day 41. In this war, U.S. forces had already moved the distance of the longest maneuver in the 1991 Gulf War in one quarter of the time. They advanced within 50 miles of Baghdad on Day Eight, entered Baghdad International Airport on Day 16, and were in the center of Baghdad on Day 20."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Cordesman has been featured prominently as a commentator on military subjects for ABC News. He served formerly in the Departments of Defense, Energy and State, and as national security assistant to Sen. John McCain. He now holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He remarked recently that he "had some operations research in my past, many years ago," although he is best known for other areas of expertise.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> INFORMS members had the opportunity to see the transformation coming. James Roche, Secretary of the Air Force and recently nominated in an unprecedented "lateral move" to become Secretary of the Army, told participants at the INFORMS national meeting last November, "We'll deploy with reduced logistics tails, and we'll attack with improved range, payload, speed, maneuverability and precision. Borrowing from portfolio analysis, we will network these systems in ways that enable us to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess in timelines unimaginable just a few years ago."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Secretary Roche also described a dramatic change in the relationship among the armed services. The close coordination in Iraq reflects the commitment to cross-training, joint planning, joint capabilities and elimination of inter-service rivalries discussed by Secretary Roche. "We will never build a single-purpose system again," Roche said.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>The Strategy Question</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> If the military results from Iraq are clear, the strategic implications are not. Some commentators have been quick to discuss this war in terms of the "Rumsfeld Doctrine" (smaller, lighter, faster, more high-tech, more flexible military) versus the "Powell Doctrine" (begin with decisive force using more conventional means, and a clear, agreed objective). Cordesman dismissed this so-called "debate," pointing out that "Secretary Powell had never expressed any public views on the war plan or any detailed views dissenting from the force transformation planning going on under Rumsfeld.... Furthermore, Secretary Powell had helped institute many of the basic changes in U.S. military technology and tactics that made victory in the Gulf War possible when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He supported a war plan in 1991 that was strikingly innovative. He had helped shape the force cuts that followed the end of the Cold War, and demonstrated quite clearly that he supported innovation and not a rigid adherence to doctrine." He also noted that it is far too early for any of Secretary Rumsfeld's preferences about force structure to have been implemented.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Nevertheless, the evidence from Iraq is relevant to a real, ongoing debate within the strategy community. Col. Harry Summers, in his highly acclaimed analysis of the Vietnam War, emphasized adherence to a conventional-warfare doctrine as one of the primary contributors to the outcome. He quoted the U. S. Army Field Manual to show the focus, at that time, on meeting and defeating the enemy's main force in direct battle. Although he did not discuss the arguments by classical Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and 20th-century British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart that maneuver and surprise could destroy an enemy's will and capability to fight without direct conflict, the contrast was clear to readers familiar with the background.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> There was more to this controversy than met the eye. Liddell Hart repeatedly cited Clausewitz  incorrectly, in some analysts' view  as the principal advocate of the need to meet and defeat the enemy on the battlefield, in comparison to his own views on "indirect approach." Liddell Hart's revised (1967) second edition of his book, "Strategy," added a chapter on guerilla warfare. In that chapter, he pointedly stated that guerilla forces cannot succeed for long without the support of a regular army nearby. He seemed to be suggesting that the United States needed to isolate the battlefield in Vietnam, maintaining a clear separation between the Communist guerillas in the south and the North Vietnamese Army, and he hinted that he had briefed U.S. military leaders on this. Summers made the same point, along with observing that the United States lacked a well-defined agreed objective and kept itself on the strategic defensive. Summers' book was the War College study of the subject. His not citing Liddell Hart, therefore, may indicate that Liddell Hart's views were then in deep disfavor among U.S. military leaders.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Summers showed his own opinion, however, via the anecdote with which he began his book: An American colonel, walking a battlefield with a North Vietnamese colonel after some postwar negotiations, commented, "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." He quoted the North Vietnamese colonel as replying, "That may be true, but it is also irrelevant."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Thus the new American style of warfare does represent a significant change in thinking. The concept of "shock and awe," generally attributed to CSIS analyst Harlan Ullman in the mid-1990s, gives greater place to psychological effects than had been customary in U.S. analyses and planning. Another relatively new concept  controversial when introduced in the mid-1990s but now apparently accepted  is "netwar" or "net-centric warfare," introduced by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation. This refers to warfare heavily dependent on computer-based and rapidly communicated information. As they succinctly summarized their idea in 1997, "In an information-rich environment, networks tend to defeat hierarchies." The Coalition forces were networked, while Iraqi forces remained highly hierarchical. The concept that Arquilla said was at first "greeted with hoots and howls" seems to have been borne out in practice.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Over the next few years, Arquilla and Ronfeldt expanded their work, developing a new warfighting doctrine, "swarm warfare," in which networks of small, light, highly mobile units quickly converge on targets and quickly disperse afterwards. This approach was extensively tested via simulation, war-gaming and other typical OR/MS methods. Apparently many of the lessons of this and other analyses influenced U.S. war planners and were implemented in Iraq.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> It is also important to recognize that all the theoretical insights incorporated in "swarm warfare" originated with operational experience. As Arquilla recounted in a recent PBS interview, "When I was working for the Central Command in the last Gulf War, it became very apparent to me that our biggest advantages came from what we knew and what our opponents didn't. On the spot, we cobbled together something called a Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS). This allowed us to know exactly where the opponent was and how to strike him." (JSTARS is the targeting system the U.S. used in Afghanistan and Iraq.)<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> The use of information to multiply force effectiveness has a parallel in logistics. Longtime readers of OR/MS Today may remember reading in 1995 about the civilian sector "substituting information for inventory." Along with improved capabilities to move resources and supplies quickly and precisely, this concept is another key part of the new U.S. military approach. For many years, ANSER, a defense-oriented research and development company in Arlington, Va., prominently displayed a sign in their headquarters office: "Amateurs discuss strategy and tactics. Professionals discuss logistics." Now, it seems, professionals need to focus on information and its uses, and strategy includes many elements directed at the enemy's communications and will to fight  and, in time, with increasing effect, at his information resources.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> This phenomenon poses a particularly important and difficult challenge for OR/MS analysts. As Secretary Roche, who holds a master's degree in operations research from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, admonished the profession, "If OR is to be as highly regarded 50 years from now as it once was in the past, then it must return to the basics, like interdisciplinary teams dealing with incommensurables, and second- and third-order effects. For instance, we will never do a great job of understanding future battle space unless we return to our roots of balancing the quantifiable and non-quantifiable, as well as facts and probability distributions."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Secretary Roche emphasized that OR analysts must expand their view: "War is not just a mechanical or scientific act," he told the INFORMS audience. "In practice, it is an art and science that operates in a foggy sea of strategy, politics and luck. I agree completely with Eliot Cohen in his new book where he argues that you cannot separate military strategy from international politics, and that war is not fought in isolation.... In business, managerial economics and decision theory explicitly account for preferences and hunches." (Among other observations, Cohen asserted that U.S. civilian leaders during the Vietnam War were too deeply involved in minor tactical decisions and too little involved in strategy.)<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=12 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>Caution: New Problems Ahead</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> With the improved way of warfare comes a new set of potential problems. Among these are vulnerability to new kinds of attacks, especially by small networked groups rather than traditional military units; increased dependence on resources outside the military's control; the loss of useful peacekeeping capabilities; and some thorny policy questions.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> The day that made many U.S. senior military leaders and analysts most uneasy during the Iraq War was March 23, when a U.S. maintenance unit got lost and wound up being ambushed. That same day, irregular enemy forces attacked supply lines and command and control points in several places the Coalition had already "captured" and moved beyond. While the events of that day proved to be an exception, a more organized and determined adversary might have done much more along those lines. In that case, the outcome would be more uncertain, and more difficult to attain.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> In addition to making the military potentially more vulnerable to attacks on supply and support, the lighter logistical "tail" means there are fewer trucks, truck drivers and other such non-combatant resources available at the end of hostilities to assist in the traditional peacekeeping and aid tasks that follow. This problem has already become apparent, at some political and strategic cost to the United States and its allies.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Cordesman quoted Lt. Gen. William Wallace, commander of the V Corps, about Iraq's performance: "We should be careful at this point, however, because wars are kind of like good wine, they tend to get better with age. But it seems to me that regardless of whether Saddam still had a command-and-control apparatus in place toward the end, it continually took Iraqi forces a long time  somewhere on the order of 24 hours  to react to anything we did. By the time the enemy realized what we were doing, got the word out to his commanders and they actually did something as a result, we had already moved on to doing something different. For a commander, that's a pretty good thing  fighting an enemy who can't react to you."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Another potential problem involves battlefield damage assessment  that is, knowing what effect one's actions have had on the enemy. In Iraq, unimpeded aerial and satellite surveillance and extensive Special Forces activity yielded consistently high-quality information. In a future conflict, with more interference from the opponent, this advantage could be decreased, thereby reducing the other advantages of information-based warfare.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Arquilla and Ronfeldt introduced their "netwar" idea as a warning, not a description of opportunity. Their primary point was that a military increasingly dependent on information and communication is also increasingly vulnerable to attacks on those resources. This, too, is something future opponents might do much more effectively than Iraq did.<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> Cordesman also cautioned against taking too much encouragement for future military activity from this success: "Military victory in Iraq is not a reason for American 'triumphalism,'" he explained. "No discussion of the Iraq War should ignore the continuing value of alliances and foreign bases. Equally, it should not ignore the value of decades of military relations and engagement with friendly Arab states, and the willingness of those states to support the U.S. even when they sometimes opposed the war or this presented serious political problems in terms of domestic political opinion. It is all too easy for the U.S. to be blinded by the beauty of its weapons and ignore these lessons. Regardless of force transformation and any new way of war, U.S. strength depends on coalitions, even when these are coalitions of the partly willing."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=6 border=0><br> "Ultimately," Cordesman concluded, "the U.S. must have the world's trust both to underpin its structure of alliances and to avoid creating a network of opposing military, political and economic alliances. Trust is not earned by new ways of war, but by justice and restraint."<BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br>  See the side story: <A HREF="frnetwarsb.html" TARGET="_top">The Air Force Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository</A><BR> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=3><B>References and Additional Reccommended Reading</B></FONT><BR> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <OL> <font size=1> <LI> Arquilla, John, and Ronfeldt, David, editors, "In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age," RAND Corporation, 1997. <LI> Arquilla, John, and Ronfeldt, David, "Swarming and the Future of Conflict," RAND Corporation, 2000. <LI> Binnendijk, Hans, "Transforming America's Military," Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 2002. <LI> Burger, Kim; Cook, Nick; Koch, Andrew; and Sirak, Michael, "What Went Right?" <I>Jane's Defence Weekly,</I> April 30, 2003. <LI> Clausewitz, Carl von, "On War," 1832; of several English translations, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976, indexed 1984, is probably the most highly regarded. <LI> Cohen, Eliot, "Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime," Free Press, 2002. <LI> Cordesman, Anthony, "The 'Instant Lessons' of the Iraq War," April 28, 2003, Web document (working draft, cited by permission), Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. <A HREF="http://www.csis.org" TARGET="_new">http://www.csis.org</A>. <LI> Liddell Hart, Basil H., "Strategy", Meridian, 1991 (reissue of 1967 2nd Edition). <LI> National Defense University: <A HREF="http://www.ndu.edu" TARGET="_new">http://www.ndu.edu</A>. <LI> Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense: <A HREF="http://www.oft.osd.mil" TARGET="_new">http://www.oft.osd.mil</A>. <LI> Public Broadcasting System (PBS), "Cyber War!" interview with several defense experts, 2003. <A HREF="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/etc/script.html" TARGET="_new">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/etc/script.html</A>. <LI> Roche, James, "<A HREF="../orms-12-02/frairforce.html" TARGET="_top">Operations Research in a New Era of National Security</A>," <I>OR/MS Today</I>, December 2002. <LI> Samuelson, Doug, "Inventory versus Information," <I>OR/MS Today,</I> June 1995. <LI> Summers, Harry, "On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War," Dell, 1984. <LI> Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," thought to date from approximately the fifth pre-Christian century. Scholars of Chinese seem to prefer the translation by Samuel Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1986) or the one by D. E. Tarver (Writers' Club Press, 2002); the translation by R. L. Wing, titled "The Art of Strategy" (Doubleday, 1988), is also popular and interesting because of Wing's extensive comments, explanations and examples. <LI> Ullman, Harlan, and Wade, James, "Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons," London, RUSI Whitehall Series, 1998.</font> </OL> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <IMG SRC="../barbluehook.gif" WIDTH="468" HEIGHT="4"><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=2 border=0><br> <FONT face="verdana, arial, helvetica" SIZE=2><I><B>Douglas A. Samuelson</B> is president of InfoLogix, Inc., a consulting company in Annandale, Va. He is also an adjunct professor at The George Washington University and at the University of Pennsylvania, and an external research professor at the Krasnow Institute, George Mason University.</i></font><BR>  <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=5 border=0><br>  <img src="../barblue.gif" width=468 height=1 border=0 alt=" "><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <font face="verdana, arial, helvetica" size="1"> <CENTER><script type="text/javascript"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"> </script></CENTER><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <LI> <A HREF="tocfr.html" Target="_top"><I>Table of Contents</A><br> <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=4 border=0><br> <LI> <A HREF="../../ORMS.shtml" TARGET="_top"><I>OR/MS Today</I> Home Page</A><br>  <img src="../cleardot.gif" width=1 height=1 vspace=8 border=0><br> <img src="../barblue.gif" width=468 height=1 border=0 alt=" "><br> <b><i>OR/MS Today</i></b> copyright � 2003 by <A HREF="http://www.informs.org/" target="_new">the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</a>. 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